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STATEMENT OF INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Ethics Bureau at Yale,1  a clinic composed of fourteen law school students 
supervised by an experienced practicing lawyer/lecturer, drafts amicus briefs in 
cases concerning the professional responsibility obligations of lawyers and the 
ethical conduct of judges; assists defense counsel with ineffective assistance of 
counsel and other claims relating to professional responsibility matters; and offers 
ethics advice and counsel on a pro bono basis to not-for-profit legal service 
providers, courts and law schools.  
The Ethics Bureau at Yale respectfully joins this brief as Amicus Curiae for 
three reasons.  First, it believes the duties of lawyers to maintain confidentiality and 
preserve the attorney-client privilege are sacred obligations. Second, it believes that 
allowing lawyers to testify with respect to privileged or confidential information 
ultimately destroys the lawyer’s access to critical information essential to effective 
representation. Third, any line drawing by the Courts as to the scope of the protection 
for lawyer-client communications should be drawn to protect from disclosure the 
former client’s address. 
The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“FACDL”) is a 
statewide organization representing over 2,000 members, all of whom are criminal 
                                                 
1 The reference to Yale is for identification purposes only.  The views expressed herein are not 
necessarily the views of Yale University or its Law School. 
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defense practitioners. FACDL is a non-profit corporation whose goal is to assist in 
the reasoned development of Florida’s criminal justice system. Its founding purposes 
are: promoting study and research in criminal law and related disciplines, ensuring 
the fair administration of criminal justice in the Florida courts, fostering and 
maintaining the independence and expertise of criminal defense lawyers, and 
furthering the education of the criminal defense community.  The question presented 
by the Court has deep implications for the attorney-client relationship between 
FACDL’s members and the clients they represent.  
The National Association for Public Defense (NAPD) is an association of 
more than 14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel throughout all U.S. 
states and territories. NAPD members include attorneys, investigators, social 
workers, administrators and other support staff who are responsible for executing 
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, including regularly 
researching and providing advice to clients on the immigration consequences of 
specific convictions. We are the advocates in jails, in courtrooms, and in 
communities and are experts in not only theoretical best practices, but also in the 
practical, day-to-day delivery of services. Our collective expertise represents state, 
county, and local systems through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel delivery 
mechanisms, dedicated juvenile, capital and appellate offices, and through a 
diversity of traditional and holistic practice models.  NAPD provides webinar-based 
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and other training to its members, including training on the utmost importance of 
protecting attorney-client confidentiality and privileged information. Accordingly, 
NAPD has a strong interest in the issue raised in this appeal. 
Founded in 1996, the Center for University of Miami Law School Ethics and 
Public Service (“Center”) is a law school-housed interdisciplinary ethics education, 
skills training, and community engagement program devoted to the values of ethical 
judgment, professional responsibility, and public service in law and society. The 
Center's goal is to educate law students to serve their communities as citizen lawyers.  
The Center’s curriculum, environmental justice clinic, and programs primarily focus 
on ethics education, professional training and community service. One of its 
programs, The Professional Responsibility & Ethics Program (PREP), is an ABA 
award-winning program that develops continuing legal education (CLE) legal ethics 
training for the legal community. PREP combines the attributes of an ethics institute 
and an ethics clinic, and has dedicated hundreds of student hours to public service 
and has educated thousands of members of the Bench & Bar. 
QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS COURT 
DOES THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHIELD A PUBLIC 
DEFENDER FROM DISCLOSING THE ADDRESS OF A FORMER 
CLIENT IN RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA BY A LITIGANT IN A 
SEPARATE CIVIL SUIT? 
 
A. Introduction  
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Can Assistant Public Defender Stan Maslona, former counsel for Alex 
Vasquez, be required to help Appellees sue his former client by testifying at a 
deposition as to the former client’s last known address?  That is the question 
presented.  And, standing alone, the information sought from the former lawyer—
the address—is, in the view of amici, privileged and its forced disclosure an assault 
on the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. 
A fortiori, the much greater amount of information actually sought and 
ordered produced—all documents identifying the client’s present address, his 
addresses for the last three years, his employers, his telephone numbers and all his 
contact information—represents a greater invasion of the privilege and would have 
an even more deleterious effect on lawyer-client relations. 
Amici present this brief in the hope that their perspectives on these matters 
will provide the Court with a better understanding of how much is at stake in what 
Appellees would have the Court condone as a trivial request. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The vigilant defense of the attorney-client privilege by the courts is critical to 
preserving the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship. Accordingly, the 
Appellees’ attempt here to secure the client information from the client’s lawyer 
must be rejected with the same ardor as if the Appellees sought to swashbuckler 
through the lawyer’s entire file.  If the principle that lawyer-client communications 
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are sacrosanct were compromised in this case, the lessons from such a decision 
would eviscerate the attorney-client privilege in its entirety.  Amici hope that their 
analysis will provide the Court with all of the constitutional, legal and practical 
reasons it needs to reject the demand for disclosure out of hand. 
ARGUMENT 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHIELDS A PUBLIC DEFENDER 
FROM DISCLOSING THE ADDRESS OF A FORMER CLIENT IN 
RESPONSE TO A SUBPOENA BY A LITIGANT IN A SEPARATE CIVIL 
LAWSUIT. 
 
(i) The Information Sought is Privileged 
Appellees want to force Assistant Public Defender Maslona to divulge a 
former client’s address.  There is no question that this information is confidential 
and, therefore, its voluntary disclosure by a current or former lawyer is absolutely 
prohibited by Rule 4-1.6 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.  Nevertheless, 
Appellees contend that the information does not come within the attorney-client 
privilege and, therefore, the lawyer can be forced to reveal it.  Appellees’ argument 
is deeply flawed and the decision below should be reversed. 
Amici’s analysis begins with a focus on the importance of the privilege to 
achieving trust between lawyer and client and a recognition of the broad definitions 
that the courts have adopted for capturing that which must be considered privileged 
if the benefits of the privilege are to be achieved.  Privileged information is generally 
considered to protect from forced disclosure communications between a lawyer and 
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a client, or the agents of either, made in confidence, for the purposes of providing or 
receiving legal advice.  As one court aptly put it, “the attorney-client privilege exists 
to protect not only the giving of professional advice, but also the giving of 
information to the lawyer to enable him to render sound and informed advice.”  
Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota LLC, 45 So. 3d 73, 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing 
Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 390, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981)).  
Indeed, the Hagans opinion went on to specify that this principle bars Appellees’ 
attempt to obtain privileged intake information:   
The central issue presented here is whether the intake 
documents prepared by Claimant’s attorney which 
memorialized Claimant’s communications made for the 
purpose of obtaining legal services are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege.  Allowing discovery of the 
attorney’s intake documents would not only intrude into 
work product, but would allow the adversary to function 
on the wits and labor of an opponent.  Such an 
interpretation would be antithetical to the purposes 
underlying the attorney-client privilege and would 
additionally impose a chilling effect on an attorney’s 
efforts to fully explore and memorialize the facts 
underlying his client’s clause. 
 
Hagens, 45 So. 3 at 76. 
The information sought in this case fits neatly within those definitions.  But 
for the representation, Assistant Public Defender Maslona would not have obtained 
the client’s address.  And he did not seek and obtain his client’s address out of idle 
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curiosity; he only sought and obtained the address in order to maintain 
communication with the client to enable him “to render sound and informed advice.” 
Lawyers have a fiduciary duty to communicate with their clients in a timely 
and comprehensive manner.  See Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.3. The lawyer may not wait 
for the client to ask for an update, but instead must promptly initiate communication.  
See Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.4.  And in order to do so, that lawyer must know where and 
how to contact the client, because many indigent defendants do not have reliable 
telephone numbers or access to email. 
Obtaining the client’s address is therefore critical to establishing and 
maintaining a meaningful and productive lawyer-client relationship.  Knowing the 
client’s address ensures that the lawyer and the client will not be limited to 
communications that are face-to-face at counsel’s office or, in the unlikely event that 
the client has email, electronic. Rather, all generally-employed methods of 
communication must be available, including correspondence, for, if face-to-face 
communication were the only available alternative, the attendant expense and delay 
would compromise the effectiveness of the representation. 
These concerns are only heightened in attorney-client relationships that arise 
in criminal cases, where the consequences of the representation, and any interference 
whatsoever with the effective communication necessary to maintain the attorney-
client relationship, are so severe.  Without the client’s address, the lawyer really 
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could not undertake to deliver competent legal services.  See Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4–1.1.  
As a result, when that address is found in the lawyer’s file, it is found there not as an 
irrelevancy, but, rather, as a crucial facilitator of lawyer-client privileged 
communications, thereby facilitating the rendition of legal services. 
(ii) Alleged Necessity Creates No Exception to the Privilege 
From a review of the record it appears that the Appellees justify their 
extraordinary request to seek the privileged information from the Public Defender 
for Mr. Vasquez on their need to secure it.  But this alleged need, even if it were 
asserted only after the party seeking the privileged information had exhausted every 
possible alternative source (a fact not present here), could never justify invading the 
privilege.  As this Court concluded in Coffey-Garcia v. South Miami Hospital, Inc., 
--- So. 3d ---, 2016 WL 3410415 (Fla. 3d DCA June 22, 2016) just last month: 
It is of no account that the answers to such questions might 
prove useful or even necessary to determine when the 
Garcias discovered or should have discovered that there 
was a “reasonable possibility” that medical malpractice 
caused Samantha’s cerebral palsy.  The hospital, clinics, 
and doctors’ need for this information to prove their statute 
of limitations defense does not justify an invasion of the 
privilege.  “[T]he attorney-client privilege . . . is not 
concerned with the litigation needs of the opposing party.”  
Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 
1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011.)  “[U]ndue hardship is not an 
exception, nor is disclosure permitted because the 
opposing party claims that the privileged information is 
necessary to prove their case.”  Id. (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
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Id. at *4.  The Hagans case reached the identical conclusion: 
The attorney-client privilege is not subject to any 
balancing test and, unlike matters protected by work-
product privilege, cannot be discovered by a showing of 
need, undue hardship, or some other competing interest.  
See Ehrhardt Florida Evidence, § 502.1 (2007 ed.) (citing 
Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Dunn, 705 So.2d 605, 608 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (“Notwithstanding a litigant's 
entitlement to work product material upon a showing of 
need and undue hardship, the attorney-client privilege is 
absolute.”)). 
 
Hagens, 45 So. 3 at 76. 
 
(iii) The Intent of the Rule Amendments was to Protect Information 
and Facilitate Communication 
In their brief, Appellees cite several Florida cases for the proposition that a 
lawyer’s knowledge of his or her client’s whereabouts is outside the privilege.  
Specifically, Appellees rely on Burden v. Church of Scientology of California, 526 
F. Supp. 44 (M.D. Fla 1981), to argue that the attorney-client privilege does not 
apply to the identity of the client and the client’s address.  But at the time these cases 
were decided, the rules of professional conduct regarding confidentiality of 
information were much narrower in scope.  
The adoption on January 1, 1987 by the Florida Supreme Court of Rule 4-1.6 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct signaled a dramatic change in the law, 
specifically addressing the scope of the duty of confidentiality.  In the view of Amici, 
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two major expansions of what was to be considered confidential render cases 
decided under the Code provision significantly less persuasive.  
First, just like the then current ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the codes adopted by all of the states, the old Florida Code of 
Professional Responsibility defined confidential information in a narrow way, 
basically limiting the lawyer’s confidentiality obligations to the “confidences” and 
“secrets” of a client.  FLORIDA CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (FL. BAR 
ASS’N 1975).  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stansbury, 374 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 
5th DCA 1979). 
Second, under the old Florida Code of Professional Responsibility, if the 
client wanted any other information kept confidential, the burden was on the client 
to ask the lawyer to do so. FLORIDA CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2, 4-3 
(FL. BAR ASS’N 1975) (using the language “[u]nless the client otherwise directs” to 
define the scope of confidentiality under EC 4-2 and 4-3). 
But the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct changed the definition so that 
it is the lawyer’s ethical obligation to preserve all information related to the 
representation, without regard to the effect of any disclosure or whether the client 
requested that it be maintained in confidence.  Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.6 (“unless the 
client gives informed consent” the lawyer must maintain confidentiality as to all 
information learned in the representation, demonstrating that the burden is now on 
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the lawyer to preserve confidential information unless he or she obtains consent from 
the client).  This expansion signifies an intent to broaden the scope of confidential 
information in order to better facilitate legal representation. 
(iv) Forcing Lawyers and Clients to Parse Distinctions Between 
Confidential and Privileged Information Undermines the Lawyer-
Client Relationship 
Amici are of the view that exploring the public policy reasons why the 
privilege must apply will demonstrate why the ruling below undermines the lawyer-
client relationship.  When lawyers meet with their clients for the first time to lay the 
foundation for the lawyer-client relationship, one of the key elements that 
introduction always includes is the lawyer’s explanation to the client of two key 
matters.  First, the lawyer emphasizes the importance of learning everything the 
lawyer needs to know about the client’s circumstances.  See Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice 
or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the 
lawyer’s being fully informed by the client”).  Part of the fiduciary duty of 
competence and diligence is full investigation of the facts and circumstances of the 
matter.  See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (the privilege “rests 
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client’s 
reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out”). 
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Second, in order to facilitate full disclosure, the lawyer must explain how the 
lawyer will keep the client’s communications confidential pursuant to Rule 4-1.6 
and not share that information with anyone without the client’s informed consent.  
Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.6(a).  This requirement exists because confidentiality 
encourages and facilitates full disclosure.  Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.6 cmt.  Lawyers 
explain these core aspects of the lawyer-client relationship to clients up front because 
the attorney-client privilege developed from two fundamental principles:  that good 
legal assistance requires full disclosure of a client’s legal problems, and that a client 
will only reveal the details required for proper representation if his or her 
confidences are protected.  Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).  
The order below, if left standing, would require lawyers to undertake a 
confusing and self-defeating explanation, warning the client that, if ever called to 
testify, the lawyer could be required to disclose any information learned that is 
merely confidential, but not privileged.  In response to this Court’s invitation, the 
Florida Bar refused to provide amicus curiae assistance to this Court based on its 
view of a strict demarcation between confidentiality and the attorney-client 
privilege.  However, the reality is that even the practicing bar often does not 
understand the distinction between these two concepts. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Par 
Four P’ship, 638 So. 2d 1050, 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (“Confidential 
communications between lawyers and clients are privileged from compelled 
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disclosure to third persons”); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.502(2).  It necessarily 
follows that it is totally unrealistic to expect clients to understand the difference.  
Rather, clients would perceive such a warning for what it is: confusing and 
disturbing evidence that the lawyer is offering the client protection with one hand 
and taking it away with the other, undermining the client’s trust along the way. 
The ruling below, therefore, strikes at the heart of the attorney-client 
relationship.  The idea that courts can force lawyers to be witnesses against former 
clients, and, more specifically, can require lawyers to divulge confidential 
information to the former clients’ detriment, whether or not that information is 
subject to the attorney-client privilege, renders the very essence of a meaningful 
lawyer-client relationship a nullity.  Neither the client nor the lawyer will be able to 
differentiate on a sentence-by-sentence or word-by-word analysis whether a 
particular communication falls within the privilege or is “merely” confidential.  The 
order below opens lawyers’ files and lays bare their memories to invasion by third 
parties, even adversaries of the client, who can then claim an entitlement to wield an 
Exacto knife to cut out chunks of information that are confidential, but not attorney-
client privileged, and use that information against former clients.  The idea that a 
lawyer would be forced to testify against a former client on a surgically precise 
differentiation between that which is privileged and that which is confidential would, 
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in effect, destroy the very protection for communications between lawyer and client 
that the privilege was designed to provide. 
This case calls to mind the policy reflected in the wise decision of the court in 
Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 424 Mass. 109, 676 N.E. 2d 436 
(1997), a case many ethics professors teach.  In Purcell the client came to the lawyer 
seeking legal advice about a landlord tenant problem.  Id. at 110.  At the end of the 
meeting, the lawyer concluded that the client might try to burn down his landlord’s 
building. Id.  The lawyer, scared that the client might actually wreak havoc, called 
the police who arrested the client in possession of items that could be used in such 
an endeavor.  Id. 
The client was charged with attempted arson and the lawyer was subpoenaed 
to testify at the client’s retrial regarding the lawyer-client conversation, including 
the threat. Id.  The client claimed privilege and the District Attorney responded that 
the “conversation” could not be privileged because it was either subject to the crime 
fraud exception or otherwise not privileged because the lawyer was not being 
consulted for advice about the planned arson.  Id. at 111-112. 
The court rejected the first argument because there was no evidence that the 
client had consulted the lawyer seeking legal advice regarding his threatened 
criminal conduct.  Id. at 113.  The court then rejected the district attorney’s second 
fallback argument that there was an excluded middle category between crime-fraud 
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and privileged communication about which the lawyer could be forced to testify.  Id. 
at 116.  Rather, the court concluded that if the lawyer-client communication did not 
fall within the crime-fraud exclusion, it had to be privileged.  Id.  In the Court’s 
opinion, it was more important to encourage lawyers to come forward to prevent 
reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm, without discouraging the lawyer’s 
intervention with the possibility that the lawyer could be “rewarded” for the 
disclosure by being forced to testify in a criminal trial about the lawyer-client 
communication.  Id. 
So too here, it is far more important to encourage communication between 
lawyer and client, than have such communications inhibited by the thought that the 
lawyer could be turned into an instrumentality of the client’s adversary because the 
content of a lawyer-client communication was confidential, but not privileged.  
Indeed, in some ways the argument is stronger here.  In Purcell, the lawyer was free 
to disclose, as he did, the possibility of arson because of an exception to the 
confidentiality rule to disclose client confidences to prevent criminal conduct.  Here, 
there is no exception to the Florida confidentiality rule that would permit voluntary 
disclosure of the address. 
(v) Why Stop There? 
Amici are deeply concerned that if this Court requires former counsel to testify 
about the address of his former client and thereby become the instrumentality for 
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forcing the client to defend a lawsuit for which he otherwise might never be served, 
it will lead to further invasion of the lawyer-client relationship.  After all, in the 
lawyer’s memory or in the lawyer’s file will be a great deal of information that falls 
into the category of confidential, but not privileged.  In permitting such an exercise 
to take place, the outcome would be that lawyers would fail to learn important 
information regarding their clients, including information that was just helpful in 
gaining trust, but arguably outside of the scope of legal advice. 
Of course, if we want to make discovery more efficient we would simply 
permit each side to depose the other side’s lawyer.  Would there be a treasure trove 
of information forthcoming?  Of course there would.  But we do not allow it because 
to do so would destroy the lawyer's role. 
This policy is reflected in the jurisprudence surrounding the attorney-client 
privilege.  While nothing about the privilege would prevent the former client from 
being deposed about his address, what the privilege enjoins, without exception, is 
any attempt to force either client or lawyer to testify about the communications 
between them.  As a result, if the client is deposed, the client can be asked to reveal 
his address; but the client cannot be asked whether he gave his lawyer the address, 
nor may the lawyer be asked if he received it, or disclose what it is.  See Upjohn Co. 
v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (explaining client cannot be compelled to answer 
question, “What did you say or write to the attorney?” but may not refuse to disclose 
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any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because such fact was included in his 
communication to his attorney); see also Brookings v. State, 495 So. 2d 135, 139 
(Fla. 1986) (“Appellant's contention that Lowery’s testimony against appellant 
waived her attorney-client privilege is erroneous.  We hold that the mere fact that a 
witness-client testifies to facts which were the subject of consultation with counsel 
is no waiver of the privilege.  It is the communication with counsel which is 
privileged, not the facts.”). 
The lawyer can only gain the rapport that is required to create a healthy 
lawyer-client relationship if the client knows that the lawyer can be trusted with the 
client’s fondest hopes and greatest fears, that the lawyer will be the client’s one true 
champion, that the lawyer would never be forced to testify regarding 
communications with the client unless the client waives the privilege on informed 
consent or the communication comes within the crime fraud exception.  See Fla. Bar 
v. Knowles, 99 So. 3d 918, 922 (Fla. 2012) (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.6 cmt.) 
(stating that “[a] fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in 
the absence of the client’s informed consent, the lawyer must not reveal information 
relating to the representation . . . [t]his [principle] contributes to the trust that is the 
hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship”). 
It may be that in the most extraordinary case a lawyer could be forced to 
testify.  But the rules clearly reflect an intent to bar the lawyer from testifying ever.  
18 
 
And all the policy reasons that create a strong bias against lawyers being forced to 
testify urge the same result here.  Having a lawyer serve as the facilitator for 
whatever goal the former client’s adversary hopes to achieve is one to be avoided if 
at all possible. 
(vi) Forcing a Public Defender to Testify Against a Former Client is 
Especially Damaging 
Many of the problems created by compelling lawyer testimony regarding 
confidential information from a former client apply to any lawyer-client relationship.  
Indeed, repeated studies have shown that full and open lawyer-client communication 
is a top priority for clients.  See, e.g., S.E. Schemenauer, What We've Got Here ... Is 
a Failure ... To Communicate: A Statistical Analysis of the Nation's Most Common 
Ethical Complaint, 30 Hamline L. Rev. 629 (2007). 
The ill effects from forced disclosure of lawyer-client confidences are 
exacerbated, however, in cases involving defendants who are assigned criminal 
defense counsel because they cannot afford to hire lawyers. See Christopher C. 
Campbell, et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions 
of their Public Defenders, 33 Beh. Sci. & Law 751, 755-56, 760-61 (2015).  Public 
defenders already are engaged in a constant battle to overcome biases and low 
expectations, which are summed up in the painful epithet “Public Pretender.”  Cara 
H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to The 
Nation's Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 Harv. J. on Legis. 487, 494 (2010) (describing 
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Florida exoneree’s description of state indigent defense bar).  Indigent defendants 
often believe that a public defender’s first loyalty is to the government that provides 
the defender’s paycheck—the same government that is prosecuting the defendant. 
Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had 
A Public Defender, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action 4, 7 (1971).   Public defenders also 
are expected—incorrectly—to provide lower-quality representation than retained 
counsel.  See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does 
the Lawyer Make?  The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 
Yale L. J. 154, 158-59 (2012). 
In short, the public defender starts off the lawyer-client relationship with a 
deep deficit in good will.  As a result, public defenders must invest much more time 
and energy than retained counsel in building a foundation of confidence and comfort 
with clients.  Campbell, et al., supra.  Yet in filling this important need, under the 
ruling below public defenders will simultaneously be increasing the risk to clients 
as the quantum of confidential conversations grows. Thus, the ruling below infects 
the lawyer-client relationship with profound, unhealthy, and unnecessary conflicting 
concerns that undermine trust. This Court should nip that infection before it spreads 
by reversing the ruling below. 
(vii) The Fifth and Sixth Amendments Require the Communications to be 
Privileged 
20 
 
Amici have focused this entire brief on the question presented, to wit:  whether 
the information sought is privileged.  But it is important to remember that the 
attorney-client privilege, by protecting the “ability to speak freely to one's attorney[,] 
helps to preserve rights protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to legal representation.”  Mills v. 
State, 476 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1985).  Mills therefore puts an end to Appellees’ 
fishing expedition. Perhaps not every professional responsibility of lawyers to their 
clients takes on a constitutional dimension.  But there is no doubt about the 
fundamental federal constitutional rights that are implicated by the lawyer’s duty of 
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege.  Without both, the right to be free 
from self-incrimination and the right to counsel would be hollow promises indeed 
since nothing could compromise those fundamental rights in the way that would 
occur if others could pry into the communications between lawyer and client. 
CONCLUSION 
It was an honor for amici to be asked to provide the Court with our views on 
this matter.  The importance of the fundamental protections provided by the privilege 
and the duty of confidentiality are at the heart of the professional work each of the 
amici undertakes.  Our hope is that we have provided a different perspective that 
will assist the Court in reaching the right result in this critical case. 
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